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Copyright in the 101st Congress: Commentary on the
Visual Artists Rights Act and the Architectural
Works Copyright Protection Act of 1990
by Jane C. Ginsburg*

INTRODUCTION

The second session of the 101 st Congress yielded significant copyright legislation. In the Visual Artists Rights Act1 and the Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act, 2 Congress revisited areas that
had been debated at the time of U.S. adherence to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Property, but that
were ultimately left out of the 1988 Berne Convention Implementation Act. 8 In the Computer Software Rental Amendments Act;' Congress extended its override of the first sale doctrine implemented in
the 1984 Record Rental Amendment/I to empower software copyright owners to prohibit rentals of copies of software, even after their
initial sale. In addition, finally, in the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act,8 Congress overruled several appellate court decisions that
had upheld States' assertion of Eleventh Amendment immunity from
copyright claims. 7 This article discusses the first two amendments to
the Copyright Act. Part I examines the subject matter, duration, and
scope of protection of the Visual Artists Rights Act.. Part II analyzes
the same issues with respect to the Architectural Works Copyright
Protection Act. In both cases, I also consider whether the new legisla• Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law.
Thanks to Bill Patry and to my colleague Henry Monaghan for most helpful comments and
suggestions.
Copyright © 1991, Jane C. Ginsburg
I. Pub. L. No. 101-650, Title VI, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990). Text reproduced at Appendix
A.

2.

Pub. L. No. 101-650, Title VII, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990). Text reproduced at Appendix

B.
3. Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988).
4. Pub. L. No. 101-650, Title Vlll, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990).
5. Pub. L. 98-450, § 2, 98 Stat. 1727 (i 984).
6. Pub. L. 101-553, 104 Stat. 2749 (1990).
7. See, e.g., Richard Anderson Photography v. Brown, 852 F.2d 114 (4th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 489 U.S. 1033 (1989); BV Engineering v. University of California at Los Angeles, 858
F.2d 1394 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 1557 (1989).
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tion brings the United States into closer compliance with the mandates of the Berne Convention.
I.

THE VISUAL ARTISTS RIGHTS ACT OF 1990

In the Visual Artists Rights Act, Congress has for the first time
included moral rights within the U.S. copyright statute. Well-known
in continental European copyright doctrine, and secured by the
Berne Convention, moral rights afford protection for the author's
personal, non-economic interests in receiving attribution for her
work, and in preserving the work in the form in which it was created,
even after its sale or licensing. 8 These rights of attribution (sometimes infelicitously labeled the "right of paternity") and of integrity
are conceptually distinct from the economic rights of exploitation set
forth in section 106 of the 1976 Copyright Act. The extent to which
U.S. copyright or other doctrines had already assimilated or simulated moral rights has been hotly debated. 9
Although, upon adhering to the Berne Convention in 1988, the
United States had declared that adequate coverage of the rights of
attribution and integrity existed, Congress in 1990 at last enacted
specific legislation on the moral rights question. The Visual Artists
Rights Act of 1990 now affords limited, but explicit rights of attribution and integrity to a narrowly defined class of visual artists. Because
the Visual Artists Rights Act achieved passage where many prior attempts to secure a U.S. moral rights law failed, 10 it is worth noting
three factors that may have prompted its enactment.
First, a question of international credibility existed: the U.S.' 1988
Berne Implementation Act's embrace of several of the Convention's
precepts was rather restrained. 11 Most particularly, some Berne co8. On moral rights in European copyright systems, see, e.g., Pollaud-Dulian, Moral Rights
in France Through Recent Case/aw, 145 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT o'AUTEUR (R.I.D.A.)
126 Ouly 1990); Marcus, The Moral Right of the Artist in Germany, 25 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP.
(ASCAP) 93 ( 1980); Merryman, The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet, 27 HASTINGS L.J. I 023
(1976). The Berne Convention's moral rights guarantee appears at article 6bis.
9. See generally Final Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne
Convention, 10 CoLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 513, 547-57 (1986) (concluding that, on the whole,
U.S. law affords meaningful equivalents to moral rights); Brown, Adherence to the Berne Convention: The Moral Rights Issue, 35 J. CoPYR. Soc. 196, 205 (1988) (Berne adherence demands
"a stronger panoply of moral rights"); Comment, The United States joins the Berne Convention:
New Obligations for Authors' Moral Rights?, 68 N.C.L. REV. 363 (1990) (contending that genuine
compliance with the Berne Convention requires enactment of moral rights provisions).
10. Some form of moral rights legislation has been regularly introduced in the U.S. Congress over the last 11 years. See H.R. REP. No. 514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., at 8 (1990).
· 11. See Ginsburg & Kernochan, One Hundred Two Years Later: The United States joins the
Berne Convention, 13 CoLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS I (1988).
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Unionists had expressed doubts regarding the accuracy or sincerity
of the U.S. declaration that its law already afforded a degree of
moral rights protection equivalent to Berne standards. 12 Enactment
·of a Visual Artists' Rights bill, albeit a limited adoption of moral
rights, may help persuade Berne partners that the U.S.' commitment
to Berne's moral rights safeguards is genuine, if only gradually
realized.
Second, while the concept of moral rights in general may inspire
trepidation among major exploiter groups, such as periodical publishers13 and motion picture producers, the subject matter of the Visual
Artists Rights Act of 1990, essentially works of painting and sculpture, presents the strongest, and most distinct, claim for moral rights
protection because of the unique importance of the physical object.
The centrality of the physical object sets moral rights in works of
visual art apart from the mainstream of copyright law. The copyright
law distinguishes between incorporeal rights of exploitation on the
one hand, and physical ownership of a particular copy on the other
hand. 14 Copyright generally does not teach the physical object. 111 In
the art world, by contrast, the key concern is the physical object itself, not (in most instances) incorporeal exploitation rights. As a result, securing the integrity of the object itself requires an additional
source of protection. Hence, protecting these works from mutilation
and destruction could achieve the socially desirable goal of art preservation with minimal disruption to most copyright owners' interests.
Third, adopting explicit moral rights in a limited domain might
afford an opportunity to experiment with adapting U.S. law to moral
rights, and might provide experiences permitting further cautious
adoption of moral rights in other copyright fields.

12. See, e.g., Dietz, The United States and Moral Rights: Idiosyncrasy or Approximation? Observations on a problematical relationship underlying United States Adherence to the Berne Convention,
142 R.I.D.A. 222 (Oct. 1989); Edelman, Entre copyright et droit d'auteur: l'integrite de ['oeuvre de
['esprit [Between Copyright and Authors' Rights: The Integrity of Works of Authorship],
1990 DALLOZ CttRON. 295, 300 (U.S. manner of adhering to Berne reveals "the congenital
inability of American law to understand the essence of moral rights").
13. See Ginsburg & Kernochan, supra note l l, at 7-8 n.34.
14. See U.S. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ l09(a), 202 (1988).
15. Except for certain modifications of the first-sale doctrine, such as the record rental
right, see 17 U.S.C. § l09(b), and the new Computer Software Rental Amendment, id.
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SUBJECT MATTER OF PROTECTION

I will discuss both the subject matter the new law covers, and the
rights it grants. The protected subject matter is defined rather
restrictively:
(l) a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a single copy, in a
limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively
numbered by the author, or, in the case of a sculpture, in multiple cast,
carved, or fabricated sculptures of two hundred or fewer that are consecutively numbered by the author and bear the signature or other identifying mark of the author; or
(2) a still photographic image produced for exhibition purposes only,
existing in a single copy that is signed by the author, or in a limited
edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the author. 18

The definition also explicitly excludes "any work made for hire." 17
The parsimoniousness of the Act's definitional section shows an attempt to achieve at least two objectives: 1) to reassure large exploiters, such as publishers of periodicals, that they need not fear moral
rights claims from artists creating works for their publications; 18 2) to
limit the law's coverage to objects of "Art," rather than of mass production.19 Moreover, even if the artistic creation meets the Act's defi16. Visual Artists Rights Act§ 602, 17 U.S.C. §IOI.The requirement that the works be
signed and, where applicable, consecutively numbered may constitute a "formality" incompatible with article 5.2 of the Berne Convention. But see H.R. REP., supra note I 0, at 12 (distinguishing numbering and marking requirement from notice of copyright).
17. Visual Artists Rights Act § 602, 17 U.S.C. § IOI.
18. Cf 17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (no termination right in works made for hire).
19. The provision of the Visual Artists Rights Act entitling the author to prevent the
destruction of a "work of recognized stature" (§ 603(a)(3)(B), 17 U .S.C. § I 06A(a)(3)(B)) supplies further indication of Congress' intention to avoid conferring moral rights on unworthy
works. However, resort to a merit criterion cuts against a long copyright tradition eschewing
value or aesthetic judgments about works of authorship. As Justice Holmes cautioned in a
1903 Supreme Court decision, judges make poor art critics, and should not be pressed into
that service: "It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only in the law to
constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations . . . . At the one
extreme some works of genius would be sure to miss appreciation. Their very novelty would
make them repulsive until the public had learned the new language in which their author
spoke . . . . At the other end, copyright would be denied to pictures which appealed to a
public less educated than the judge." Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S.
239, 251-52 (1903).
Moreover, the criterion may be incoherent. If a work has not been publicly displayed
before its owner destroys it, how can the work be of "recognized" stature? Arguably, substitution of the term "artist of recognized stature" might have rectified the problem. Such a
step would, however, provoke further anomalies because it would penalize the unknown, or
up-and-coming artist. For these reasons the reference to "recognized stature" is regrettable.
See also H.R. REP., supra note 10, at 15 (explaining why the House version of the bill deleted a
"recognized stature" predicate to a visual artists rights claim).
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mt10n, it is important to understand that the Act secures rights only
with respect to the two-hundred (or fewer) physical copies; the Act
does not protect the "work" in the incorporeal copyright sense. In
other words, the Act protects particular copies, not any "image" independent of those limited number of copies.
This distinction between copy and image carries several consequences. Most obviously, it does not forbid destruction or mutilation
of any copy falling outside the definition. There is practical merit to
this result; for example, it seems absurd to authorize a moral rights
claim against a purchaser who allegedly mutilated her copy of a
poster published in an edition of several thousand. 20 However, the
limitation of the definition of "works of visual art" to originals and
up to two hundred limited edition copies generates other, more debatable results. Most importantly, artists are afforded no general
right against misrepresentation or distortion of these images, even by
means of large scale or gross alterations of reproductions of the
works. In essence, the Act would protect Leonardo's original canvas
of the Mona Lisa against Duchamp's moustache (had Leonardo created his work after the Act's effective date); but the Act would not
prevent Duchamp from making his own copy of the Mona Lisa and
drawing a moustache on that copy. Thus, an art book publisher who
prints a substantially discolored version of a painting, or a poster
manufacturer who enlarges and reproduces a small portion of the
work, 21 or a magazine publisher who prints only half a photograph,
20. Although the rights granted under the Visual Artists Rights Act do not apply to editions of works exceeding two hundred copies, if a work is first published in a limited edition
of two hundred or less, and subsequently is published in a larger edition, the second publication will not deprive the limited edition of protection. By the same token, a photographic
image initially produced for "exhibition purposes," "will not fall outside the ambit of the
[law)'s protection simply because it is later used for non-exhibition purposes." H.R. REP.,
supra note 10,at 12.
On the other hand, the statute's specification that the photographic image (as opposed to
particular copies) have been created for exhibition purposes appears to preclude protection
for subsequent limited edition exhibition copies of photographic images when the image was
first produced for other purposes, such as news reporting or fashion coverage. Making the
initial purpose for creation of the photographic image dispositive is unfortunate, because it
fails to recognize that some images created for journalistic or similar purposes may come to
be appreciated as works of art. Had the definition turned on the purpose for which particular
copies (rather than the image) were produced, then the initial exploiter, for example a magazine, would have retained full leeway to adapt the copy of the photograph to its purposes. But
at least the physical integrity of copies comprising the later limited edition could also have
been protected. Securing the integrity of the 200 or fewer copies created for exploitation as
works of art would have furthered the goal of the Visual Artists Rights Act to enhance the
creative climate for artists, and to permit them to preserve their creations for the benefit of
all the public. See H.R. REP., supra note IO, at 5, 7-10.
21. Cf Wojnarowicz v. American Family Association, 745 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
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would incur no liability under the Act. Nor does the Act reach the
problem of exploitations of artworks that the creator finds demeaning, for example, laminating reproductions (beyond the key two hundred) of a painting onto ashtrays. 22 To be sure, these activities may
constitute copyright infringement of the derivative works right, but a
copyright claim avails the artist only if she retains the pertinent copyright interest. If the artist's name is associated with the distorted version, she may also have a federal or state claim for false representation or false designation of origin. 23 But the remedy for a false
representation might be limited to requiring accurate labelling of the
distorted version; it might not forestall the distortion itself.
Should Congress have empowered the artist to prevent the dissemination of copies (beyond the two hundred) incorporating
a-truthfully labelled-distortion of her work? Put another way, independently of the copyright, should the artist have received the
right to compel the accurate representation of her work, or to ensure
the communication of her work in an appropriate context, whatever
the number of copies made or the medium of dissemination? My answer may depart somewhat from moral rights orthodoxy. I believe
that the right of an artist who is not a copyright owner to ensure the
production of faithful copies need not extend beyond the first 200.
These 200 copies supply the core of the artist's creation, and may
afford sufficient representations for the public to consult in order to
perceive the work as the artist intended it to be seen. Where these
representations are available to the public, I would hesitate to prevent the copyright holder's dissemination of the offending versions. 24
(third party defendant created and distributed photographs of fragments of plaintiff artist"s
collage), discussed infra note 25.
22. Moreover, even with respect to works covered by the law, the Visual Artist's Rights
Act exempts "[t]he modification of a work of visual art which is the result of conservation, or
of the public presentation, including lighting and placement ... unless th!! modification is
caused by gross negligence." § 603(c)(2), 17 U.S.C. § 106A(c)(2).
23. Cf. Gilliam v. ABC, 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1978) (recognizing Lanham Act claim for
truncation of plaintiffs television program).
24. Arguably, a broader moral right of faithful reproduction independent of copyright
could also hinder subsequent artists who wish to "quote from" a prior art work, for example
by means of collage or parody. 1 find this objection, raised, perhaps cynically, on behalf of
artists by representatives of major producer groups, including software, book, magazine, music, and newspaper publishers, and record and motion picture producers (see Baumgarten,
Gorman & Meyer, Preserving the Genius of the System: A Critical Examination of the Introduction of Moral Rights into United States Law (Sept. 11, 1989) (available in Columbia-VLA
Journal of Law & the Arts Editorial Office)) fairly unpersuasive. The derivative works right
under copyright also poses a potential chill to these activities, yet there are no calls for curtailment of economic rights in art works. In both cases, the fair use doctrine, and perhaps the
first amendment, would temper the exclusive rights to permit these kinds of artistic
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On the other hand, all artists should be able to require that producers of distorted copies must disclose that the work has been altered. Similarly, if the artist objects to the representation, or to the
context in which the work is set, the producer should also be obliged
to disclose that objection. This kind of disclosure remedy serves artist
and public alike. It protects the artist from full association with a representation she at least in part disowns, and it ensures that the public
will not be misled. 211 Equally important, such disclosure may be necessary to ensure Berne compliance. The Berne Convention requires
member countries to afford authors the right "to object to any distortion, mutilation, or other modification of, or other derogatory action . . . which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation." 26
Failure to disclose alterations and the artist's objections to them implicitly associates her with a mangled or miscast version of her work,
and thus could prejudice her honor or reputation as an artist.
The limited definition of protected artworks has another, more unfortunate consequence. The law not only disqualifies integrity claims
of salaried authors and of creat<?rs of large editions, but also fails to
afford these authors an attribution claim. 27 Whatever the merits of
commentary.
25. In Wojnarowicz v. American Family Association, supra note 21, plaintiff artist created
a collage of images, a few of which depicted homoerotic acts. Defendant, an organization
"chartered for the declared purposes ... of promoting decency in American society," 745 F.
Supp. at 133, photographed fragments of plaintiff artist's collage depicting those acts, and
distributed a brochure containing the fragments as part of a campaign denouncing government funding of allegedly obscene art. Plaintiff asserted that defendant's extraction of the
fragments violated his right under copyright to authorize the creation of derivative works, 17
U.S.C. § 106(2); violated the provision of the federal trademarks law proscribing false designations of origin, 15 U.S.C. § l 125(a); and violated the New York State statute protecting
the integrity rights of artists, N.Y. Cultural Affairs Law § 14.03. The New York State law
protects against "defaced, mutilated or modified" reproductions, as well as originals or limited editions, of art works. The court upheld the New York claim. However, it rejected the
copyright claim on the ground that defendant's use of the work was for purposes of criticism
or commentary, and therefore was shielded by the fair use doctrine, 17 U.S.C. § 107. The
court also rejected the trademarks claim on the ground that defendant was not engaged in
commercial activity.
The Visual Artist's Rights Act of 1990, had it been in effect at the time of Wojnarowicz's
suit, would not have afforded him a claim. On the other hand, had the new law applied, it
would not have precluded Wojnarowicz from obtaining relief under other theories. The Visual Artist's law does not preempt a state claim against mutilated reproductions. See discussion
infra. Moreover, the Wojnarowicz court's application of the fair use doctrine may have given
too short shrift to the misleading nature of defendant's presentation of plaintiffs work.
26. Berne Convention, article 6bis.l.
27. Authors not covered by the new law who seek attribution for their works still have
recourse to the federal trademark law and to state moral rights laws; the Visual Artists Rights
Act does not preempt state claims addressing subject matter not covered by the Act's definition of a "work of visual arts." See § 605, 17 U.S.C. § 30l(f), discussed infra.
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limiting the class of artists who may benefit from the integrity right,
the arguments in favor of that limitation do not readily extend to the
attribution right. The artist's interest in receiving credit for her creation, and the public's interest in knowing the creator's identity, do
not diminish as the size of the edition increases. By the same token,
where attribution is concerned, it should not matter whether the
work is displayed in an art gallery, or on the pages of a magazine.
Nor is a work-for-hire exception appropriate. The work for hire doctrine allocates ownership of the economic rights, but, despite deeming the employer the statutory "author," the doctrine is not a labeling law; it does not purport to recast the patron as the true creator. 28
Recognizing employees'-for-hire attribution rights does not modify
the employer's rights of economic exploitation; rights in the work remain as alienable as before. It simply requires addition of a credit
line somewhere on the work of visual art.
B.

DURATION OF PROTECTION

Not only does the law limit the class of moral rights beneficiaries, it
also truncates the duration of protection, as well as certain substantive protections, particularly regarding the integrity right. With regard to duration, the law restricts the duration of the granted attribution and integrity rights to the life of the author, 29 although the
term of protection of economic rights under copyright is the life of
the author plus fifty years. 30 State law protections lasting beyond the
life of the author, however, <1:re preserved. 31 The "Berne-compatibility" of this provision is debatable. Article 6bis.2 requires that the
rights of integrity and attribution "be maintained, at least until the
expiry of the economic rights . . . . " However, the treaty continues:
Those countries whose legislation, at the moment of their ratification or
accession to this Act, does not provide for the protection after the death
of the author of all [the attribution and integrity] rights may provide
that some of these rights may, after his death, cease to be maintained.
28. Indeed, to purvey a work of visual art merely under the employer's name with no
credit to the actual creator might, even under current law, give rise to a claim of false
description or designation of origin. See, e.g., Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid,
846 F.2d 1485, 1498 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (dictum), affd, 109 S.Ct. 2166 (1989); Lamothe v.
Atlantic Recording Corp., 847 F.2d 1403, 1407 n.2 (9th Cir. 1988) (dictum); Smith v.
Montoro, 648 F.2d 602, 605-06 (9th Cir. 1981) (dictum).
29. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 § 603, 17 U.S.C. § l06A(d)(l).
30. 17 U .S.C. § 302(a). For works created before the Act's effective date, "title to which
has not, as of such effective date, been transferred from the author," the duration is life plus
fifty. Visual Artists Rights Act § 603(d)(2), 17 U .S.C. § l 06A(d)(2).
31. 17 u.s.c. § 30l(f)(2)(C).
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According to the World Intellectual Property Organization's Guide
to the Berne Convention, this provision reflects a compromise between
civil-law and common-law countries, for in many of the latter countries defamation actions secure the right of integrity, and these actions do not survive the author's death. 32 But this exemption from
the requirement of post-mortem protection would not seem to apply
if the country protected neither the integrity nor the attribution
rights after the author's death. By the same token, the exemption
would not apply if the acceding country had protected both rights
post-mortem. The U.S. may be in the curious position of failing to
qualify for the exemption on both grounds. To the extent that federal trademarks and copyright law secured rights of attribution and
integrity, both these rights survived the author. To the extent that
state law·provided the source of moral rights, some states protected
both rights post mortem, and other states (the majority) had no
moral rights statutes, and no case law protecting either the right of
integrity or the right of attribution. Hence, at the time of Berne accession, the U.S. appears either to have protected both rights postmortem, or not at all. As a result, the exemption may not apply, and
the U.S. would be in violation of the Berne Convention's duration
requirement for moral rights. Arguably, the subsistence of state law
protections keeps the U.S. in compliance, but so long as the post
mortem coverage is available in only a few states, U.S. compliance on
the national level seems questionable.
C.

SCOPE OF PROTECTION

As discussed earlier, the Visual Artists Rights Act's definition of protected subject matter does more than simply restrict the class of eligible artists. The Act's definitional section also has the effect of limiting the grant of substantive rights to claims concerning certai.n
physical copies, rather than to the artistic image, whatever its form or
number of copies in which it is embodied. In addition, even when the
physical copy qualifies under the Act, the law further curtails the
right of integrity when the copy is incorporated in a building. In accommodating the interests of owners of buildings incorporating
murals and sculpture, the law establishes a dual regime, dividing
building-incorporated artworks that cannot be . removed from the
buildings without causing "destruction, distortion, mutilation or
other modification of the work," from incorporated artworks that
32.

WIPO,

GUIDE TO THE BERNE CONVENTION

,r 6bis.10 (1978).
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can be removed without substantial damage. If the work falls in the
first category, and at the time of creating the work for the building
the artist executed a writing consenting to the installation of the
work in the building and acknowledging that the work's removal
could damage or destroy it, then a building owner who wishes to renovate or destroy the building (and hence damage or destroy the incorporated artworks), may do so without the artist's permission. Indeed, the owner need not even notify the artist of the impending
destruction. 88 However, if the work can be removed from the building, then an owner who wishes to renovate or destroy the building
and does not wish to preserve the artworks must notify the artist and
give her three months to remove the work, at her own cost. If the
artist pays to remove the work, she becomes the title owner to the
physical object. 84
This division of building-incorporated artworks into removable
works, to which integrity rights attach (but for whose exercise the
artist must pay) and unremovable works, to which no integrity rights
attach, resolves the perhaps irreducible conflict between property
rights in the building and moral rights in the work in the owner's
favor. In effect, the law seeks to prevent the artist from holding the
building hostage to the artworks. One additional consequence of this
division (a consequence I believe the drafters anticipated, but left unstated), concerns so-called "site-specific" art, that is, works designed
for a particular architectural environment. Works of this kind can be
removed from their sites without damage to their physical integrity,
but separation from the site may aesthetically "destroy" the work by
eliminating its architectural context. A well-known example of a sitespecific work was a sculpture called "Tilted Arc," a work perhaps
pugnaciously described as a large curved slash of rusting iron interrupting a plaza in front of the International Court of Trade in New
York· City. The artist intended it to be a provocative piece of public
art. He succeeded, so much so that the people who lived and worked
in the area of the plaza demanded that the work be removed and the
plaza restored. Despite the .artist's claims that he had designed the
work for that particular plaza, and that the work would lose its mean33. If the building owner fails to obtain the necessary signed agreement, then integrity
·rights would apply to the artworks, even though they are inextricably incorporated in the
building. If the owner later sought to renovate or destroy the building, the artist's rights
would therefore. come into play. However, one may anticipate that most courts would limit
the artist's relief to an award of damages.
34. Visual Artists Rights Act § 604, 17 U.S.C. § l l 3(d).
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ing in any other site, Tilted Arc ultimately was removed. 311 Under the
bill, were an artist to insist that a work is so "site specific" that its
removal constitutes at least a spiritual "mutilation," the artist would
have no integrity claim, for the artist would herself have classed the
work as "unremovable," and therefore outside the ambit of integrity
rights. If the artist acknowledged that the work can be removed,
then at least the artist would be able to reclaim the work from the
owner.
There is one more important qualification of the integrity right,
and of the attribution right as well. 36 Under the law, moral rights are
not transferable, but they are waivable. 37 The waiver provision is
probably consistent with article 6bis of the Berne Convention. While
that treaty specifies the independence of moral rights from economic
rights, and further emphasizes that moral rights persist "even after
the transfer of the said [economic] rights," article 6bis does not
clearly prohibit the waiver of moral rights. 38 On the other hand, the
independence and persistence of moral and economic rights under
Berne also implies that a grant of economic rights does not of itself
entail a waiver of moral rights. Rather, respect for the independence
35. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 1989, § 2, at 33, col. I.
36. The Visual Artist's Rights Act also provides for application of the fair use defense,
and states: "This title does not authorize any governmental entity to take any action or enforce restrictions prohibited by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States." Visual Artists Rights Act §§ 607, 609. The latter provision would seem entirely superfluous: Congress does not have the power to authorize governmental actions that would
violate the Constitution. The former provision also is questionable. With respect to a fair use
qualification of the right of integrity, it is difficult to perceive how mutilating an original (or
one of a limited edition) advances any public policy or secures any public benefit. Fair use
generally concerns the productive use of a prior work in the creation of a new expression. See
generally Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, I 03 HARV. L. REV. 1106 (1990) (to be "fair," a
use should be "transformative"). Under the Visual Artists Rights Act, one can certainly mutilate a multiple (one of over 200) to make a point (parodistic or otherwise) about a work; the
social need to destroy the original therefore is not at all apparent. With respect to a fair use
qualification of the right of attribution, the "fairness" of denying authorship credit, or of
falsely attributing the artist's name, also seems dubious. Cf Weissmann v. Freeman, 868 F.2d
1313 (2d Cir. 1989) (rejecting fair use claim by scholar who reproduced former co-author's
material without permission and removed co-author's name from the text). In this context, it
is worth noting that many Berne countries whose copyright laws include provisions essentially
equivalent to the fair use exception make that exception subject to acknowledging the authorship of the copied source. See, e.g., France, Law of March 11, 1957, art. 41.3; Italy, Law
of April 22, 1941, arts. 65-67; Spain, Law of November 11, 1987, arts. 32-33. See also Berne
Convention, art. 10, els. 2 & 3 (authorizing member nations to permit certain uncompensated
uses of artistic works for purposes of teaching: "mention shall be made of the source and the
name of the author if it appears thereon").
3 7. Visual Artists Rights Act § 603(e), 17 U .S.C. § !06A(e).
38. See, e.g., S. RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND
ARTISTIC WORKS 1886-1986, at 467 (1987).
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of moral rights suggests that any waiver, to be effective, must be
stated with sufficient specificity to distinguish the moral rights waiver
from affirmative transfers of economic interests. Were a federal visual artists' rights law to permit art owners and exploiters to shake off
artists' rights restraints by means of a blanket, boiler-plate waiver,
then the U.S. would be honoring the precepts of the Berne Convention in only the most formalistic, indeed cynical way. Happily, the law
requires that any waiver be specifically set forth both respecting the
work and the owner's use.
The law protects artists by permitting waiver only
if the author expressly agrees to such waiver in a written instrument
signed by the author. Such instrument shall specifically identify the
work, and the uses of that work, to which the waiver applies, and the
waiver shall apply only to the work and uses so identified. 89

This language makes clear that an "all my right, title and interest"
sort of waiver would be void. The law thus denotes sensitivity to the
specificity of moral rights, while introducing a degree of flexibility
toward art object owners and/ or copyright exploiters permissible
under Berne. Arguably, the best recognition of moral rights would
countenance no waivers. This position, however, is probably too extreme for the U.S., and Berne does not require it. As a practical matter, moreover, despite their formal prohibition, de facto waivers are
likely to occur. The artist is protected under a regime requiring specificity of waivers better than under one where an ideologically pure
no-waiver law is in fact rarely observed.
Moreover, it is worth recalling that under the law, the burden of
securing a waiver falls on the party other than the artist. If the art
object's owner, or the grantee of the copyright in the artwork, fails
to obtain a writing from the artist executing the waiver, then the artist retains all moral rights. It is up to the other party to secure the
artist's written agreement to change the initial allocation of moral
rights. Absent this legislation, most of an artist's moral rights protections could be obtained, at the artist's initiative, only by contract. Because many artists may be poor negotiators, or may conduct their
business rather informally, requiring artists to "contract into" moral
rights often as a practical matter denied them the exercise of moral
rights. Now, the very informality of art work commissions may work
to artists' advantage, for a handshake deal or a vague writing will not
39.

Visual Artists Rights Act§ 603(e), 17 U.S.C. § l06A(e).
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effect the waiver. The law's reversal of the initial position may therefore carry considerable favorable consequences for artists.• 0
Arguably, the requirement of specific waivers will in the long run
simply enhance lawyers' and word processors' employment opportunities, for lawyers will be engaged to devise language sufficiently
comprehensive and detailed to fend off every conceivable exercise of
moral rights. This would defeat the purpose of compelling artists and
art work owners to reflect on and negotiate over the genuine need to
alter or destroy the work. In anticipation of this possibility, the law
affords artists an additional safeguard by instructing the United
States Copyright Office to conduct a study of the practice developed
under the law's waiver clause. 41 Congress has thus expressed an intent to monitor the issue in order to ensure that artists do not in fact
end up losing their moral rights through abuses of waivers.
D.

FEDERAL PREEMPTION

Finally, to appreciate the availability and scope of artists' moral
rights following enactment of the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990,
it is important to analyze the Act's preemption provision.• 2 Preemption of state law economic rights under the 1976 Copyright Act occurs when the work to be protected comes within the subject matter
of sections 102 and 103, and the right sought to be vindicated is
equivalent to one of the rights of exploitation set forth in section
106. 43 Preemption of state law moral rights occurs when the work to
be protected is a work of visual art as defined in the new Act, and the
right sought to be vindicated is equivalent to the rights of integrity
or of attribution. While these provisions seem parallel, the preemptive effect of the Act appears to be far less than the federal preemption of economic rights set forth in the 1976 Copyright Act. Moral
rights preemption is weaker in part because of the limited subject
matter coverage of the Visual Artists Rights Act. For example, the
Act leaves it open to the states to protect categories of works otherwise excluded, e.g., audiovisual works. The Act also permits state
protection of works that fall within protected categories, but are not
covered because they are not originals or part of an edition of two
40. However, the law also provides that one joint author's waiver of moral rights binds all
joint authors. Visual Artists Rights Act§ 603(e)(l), 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e)(l).
41. Visual Artists Rights Act § 608(a). Congress also directed the Copyright Office to
conduct a study on the feasibility of implementing artists' resale royalties, id. § 608(b).
42. Visual Artist Rights Act § 605, 17 U.S.C. § 301(£).
43. 17 U.S.C. § 30l(a).
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hundred copies, or, in the case of photographs, were not "produced
for exhibition purposes only. " 44
Moral rights preemption also does not apply to state regulation of
"activities violating legal or equitable rights which extend beyond the
life of the author. " 411 The meaning of this provision is unclear. It may
mean that state moral rights laws granting post mortem protection
are preempted if the claim is brought by a live artist, but are revived
if the artist is dead. Or the provision may mean that state moral
rights laws granting protection coterminous with the author's life are
preempted, while state laws affording post mortem protection remain
in effect whether or not the artist is alive. In either event, the preemption provision does not seem likely to accomplish the goal of ensuring national uniformity in governance of artists' moral rights.4 6
However, once the federal moral rights law cut artists' specific integrity and attribution rights off at death, preservation of longer durational state laws may have been necessary to maintain at least arguable Berne compliance. 47
II.

ARCHITECTURAL WORKS COPYRIGHT PROTECTION ACT
OF 1990

The Berne Convention includes "works of architecture" among
copyright subject matter which member countries must protect. 48 In
the 1988 Berne Convention Implementation Act, Congress set forth
explicit protection for architectural plans, 49 but made no provision
for completed structures. Absent explicit coverage for the structures,
works of architecture would be protected only to the extent to which
they constituted "pictorial graphic or sculptural" works within the
meaning of the statute. The statutory definition of these works would
have excluded most architecture: a building is a "useful article," 110
and the designs of such articles are copyrightable as pictorial, graphic
or sculptural works "only if, and to the extent that, such design incorporates pictorial, graphic or sculptural features that can be. identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of,
44. See H.R. REP., supra note 10, at 21.
45. Visual Artists Rights Act § 605(2)(C), 17 U.S.C. § 30l(f)(2)(C).
46. Cf., H.R. REP., supra note 10, at 21 (articulating policy of uniform treatment of moral
rights).
47. See discussion supra, text at notes 29-32.
48. Berne Convention art. 2.1.
49. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (amended definition of "pictorial, graphic or sculptural work").
50. Defined in the statute as "having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to
portray the appearance of the article or to convey information." 17 U .S.C. § 101.
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the utilitarian aspects of the article. " 111 Thus, detachable decorative
features such as friezes or caryatids might be copyrightable; the
building as a whole mightnot. 112 Indeed, the less exuberant the architecture, the less likely the building would be to meet the 1976 statute's definition.
A.

SUBJECT MATTER AND DURATION OF PROTECTION

In the Architectural Works Copyright Act of 1990, Congress
granted protection to the building, subject to a standard · of
copyrightability more generous than that accorded pictorial, graphic
or sculptural works. Congress imposed no "separability" test, but remitted assessment of protectability to the general copyright criterion
of originality of expression. 113 An architectural work will meet this
standard so long as the claimant does not seek to protect "individual
standard features" 114 and functional requirements did not dictate the
structure's form. 1111 Congress specified "individual" standard features
in order to make clear that combinations of standard features may be
original even if the particular components are banal. 116 Protection
would extend to the combination, not to the individual components.
The functionality limitation on the protectability of architectural
works may be understood as a corollary to the doctrine of idea/expression merger, particularly as it has developed with regard to computer software copyright protection. In that context, several courts
have endeavored to distinguish computer program code or structure
that is required by the task to be accomplished (not protectable),
from code or structure that constitutes one of several ways to achieve
the program's particular useful purpose (protectable). 117
51. 17 u.s.c. § 101.
52. See, e.g., Demetriades v. Kaufman, 680 F. Supp. 658 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). See generally
Note, Copyright Protection for Architecture and the Berne Convention, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 403, 44656 (1990) (reviewing U.S. case law on copyright and architecture).
Moreover, the meaning of artistic features "separable" from utilitarian features has yet to
receive clear articulation from the courts. Compare Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl,
632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980) (2-1 decision) (ornamental belt buckle held "separable") with
Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985) (2-1 decision)
(torso figures used as shirt forms not separable) and Brandir Int'I v. Cascade Pac. Lumber
Co., 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987) (minimalist sculpture designed as bicycle rack not separable). See generally Perlmutter, Conceptual Separability in the Design of Useful Articles, 37 J. CoPYR.
Soc. 339 (1990) (reviewing and criticizing decisions).
53. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (protection for "original works of authorship").
54. Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act § 702(a), 17 U .S.C. § 10 I.
55. See H.R. REP. No. 735, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., at 20-21 (1990).
56. See H.R. REP., supra note 55, at 18.
57. See, e.g., Whelan v,Jaslow, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031
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The duration of protection for architectural works is the same as
that of other works under copyright: the life of the author plus fifty
years, or in the case of a work made for hire, seventy-five years from
publication, or one hundred years from creation, whichever expires
first. 118 The definition of architectural work creates one peculiarity if
the work is for hire: because the "architectural work" is expressed in
the plans as well as in the completed structure, the period of protection will start to run from creation or publication of the plans, rather
than from completion of the building. Thus, if plans are created in
1995, but the building is not built until 2030, protection will expire
in 2095 (one hundred years from creation of the unpublished plans},
not in 2105 (seventy-five years from construction and publication of
the building119}. While defining the "architectural work" to include
the plans as well as the completed structure may thus appear to disadvantage the copyright owner of an architectural work for hire, restricting the definition to completed structures would have produced
even more problematic results. Congress recognized that .such a definition could leave a major gap in coverage if a third party acquired
the plans for a yet-to-be-constructed building and, using the plans,
built the building first. 80 If protection for the "architectural work"
attached only to the built design, there could be no infringement of
the architectural work because that work would not yet exist. 81 Nor,
(1987) (structure of program not functional); E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp., 623 F. Supp.
1485 (D. Minn. 1985) (same); Plains Cotton Coop. v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., 807 F.2d
1256 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 821 (1987) (structure functional because essential to
purpose of program).
58. Regarding works created on or after its date of enactment, the Architectural Works
Copyright Act contains no specific article governing duration; the general period of protection set forth in section 302 of the 1976 Copyright Act therefore applies. For the duration of
copyright in architectural works created before the Act's enactment, see discussion infra at
text and notes 63-67.
59. It is not clear whether construction of a building constitutes its "publication." Compare 17 U .S.C. § 101 (definition of "publication": public display does not of itself constitute
publication) with Letter Edged in Black Press v. Public Building Comm'n. of Chicago, 320 F.
Supp. 1303 (N .D. Ill. 1970) (public display of monumental sculpture without notice of copyright or other limitation constitutes publication under 1909 Act). Congress considered, but
declined "to provide a special definition of publication of an architectural work." H.R. REP.,
supra note 55, at 24.
60. See H.R. REP., supra note 55, at 19 (discussing the drafting of the definition to avoid
the problem of a "gap").
61. There is an implicit condition that the built structure have been built with the architect's authorization. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (definition of copyrightable subject matter as a
''fixed" work of authorship; an unauthorized fixation of a work does not bring the work within
federal copyright subject matter). See S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 51 (1975) ("a work would
be considered 'fixed in a tangible medium of expression' if there has been an authorized
embodiment in a copy or phonorecord"}.
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if protection for the plans were to have remained as it was under the
unamended copyright law, would building the building from the
plans have constituted an infringement of the plans. 62
Finally, Congress provided a limited form of retroactivity, in favor
of architectural works that, as of the amendment's 1990 enactment,
are "unconstructed and embodied in unpublished plans or drawings. " 63 If the work remains unconstructed, protection will expire
December 31, 2002. Because Congress sought to encourage construction of these works, it provided for a longer duration if tonstruction
occurs by December 31, 2002. 64 The precise duration of such architectural works varies according to whether or not the work was for
hire. If the unpublished architectural work was for hire, copyright
endures for one-hundred years following its creation. However, to
enjoy the full potential period of protection, the work must be constructed by the end of 2002; thus, if the one-hundred year period
extends beyond 2002, and the work is not constructed, protection for
the architectural work will be cut off at the end of 2002. 611 On the
other hand, if the one-hundred year period would have expired on or
before the end of 2002, and if the work is constructed and published
by that time, the work will benefit from an additional twenty-five
years' protection. 66 If the unpublished architectural work was not for
hire, protection will endure for fifty years beyond the life of the author. However, if that period extends beyond 2002, and the work is
not constructed, protection for the architectural work will be cut off
62. See, e.g., Demetriades v. Kaufman, 680 F. Supp. 658 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
Another effect of defining the "architectural work" as embodied in plans as well as in
completed structures is to give a double status to architectural plans. These are now both
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, and architectural works. The difference between the
two categories concerns the scope of protection (and, in certain instances, the duration, see
infra note 64) of the copyright in the plans.
63. Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act § 706.
64. Cf. 17 U .S.C. § 303 (works created, but not published, before 1978 shall be protected
at least until December 31, 1990, and if published by that dates shall be protected at least
until December 31, 2027).
65. However, the plans will remain protected as pictorial, graphic or sculptural works
until the normal period of duration under the 1976 Act. As pictorial, graphic or sculptural
works, the plans will be protected against reproductions in two dimensions, as well as in mod~
els, but constructing the building from the plans will generally not constitute infringement of
the pictorial, graphic or sculptural work. See Demetriades, supra note 62.
66. The House Report to the Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act indicates
that 17 U.S.C. § 303, governing the duration of works unpublished as of the 1976 Act's
effective date, and affording an extra twenty-five years' protection if the work is published by
the end of 2002, supplies authority for the additional twenty-five year protection for architectural works. See H.R. REP., supra note 55, at 24. However, what constitutes "publication" of
the constructed work, remains uncertain. See supra note 59.
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at the end of 2002. If the author died fifty or more years before
2002, and if the work is constructed and published by the end of
2002, protection will endure until December 31, 2027 .67
B.

SCOPE OF PROTECI'ION

Although Congress has expanded the subject matter of protection
to admit works of architecture, it has been less generous regarding
the scope of protection afforded. First, the new law substantially
qualifies the derivative works right by providing that "the owner of a
building embodying an architectural work may, without the consent
of the author or copyright owner of the architectural work, authorize
the making of alterations to the building . . . . " 68 Similarly, the same
provision entitles building owners to destroy the structure without
the architect's permission. 69 This provision affords maximum discretion to building owners and thus truncates creators' rights. Curiously,
the pressure for this provision came not from building owners but
from certain architects who appeared before Congress actively disclaiming any desire to prevent building owners from altering or destroying the building. 70 Thus, unlike the Visual Artists Rights Act, in
which Congress attempted to chart some middle course through the
interests of creators and building owners, Congress here simply
adopted the testifying architects' suggestion and gave full discretion
to building owners to alter or destroy the structures.
The law also limits the scope of protection by providing that
the copyright in an architectural work that has been constructed does
not include the right to prevent the making, distributing, or public display of pictures, paintings, photographs, or other pictorial representations of the work, if the building in which the work is embodied is located in or ordinarily visible from a public place. 71

This provision is problematic, particularly when compared with the
scope of protection afforded similarly situated works, such as monu67. See H.R. REP., supra note 55, at 24-25, for a series of hypothetical cases elaborating the
calculus of duration.
68. Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act of 1990 § 704(a); 17 U.S.C. § 120(b).
69. Id.
70. See Architectural Design Protection, Hearing on H.R. 3990 and H.R. 3991 Before the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of justice of the Committee on the
judiciary, House of Representatives, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 15-18 (statement of Michael Graves,
architect), 130 (statement of Richard Carney, Managing Trustee, Chief Executive Officer,
Frank Lloyd Wright Foundation) (comm. print) (March 14, 1990). Building owners did not
participate in the Hearings.
71. Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act§ 704(a); 17 U.S.C. § 120(a).
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mental sculpture. As a "pictorial, graphic or sculptural work," the
latter creation receives protection against the same kinds of reproductions, even though the work may be set in a public place. 72 There
is no apparent reason a Frank Lloyd Wright should not retain control
over posters, post cards and T-shirts depicting the Guggenheim Museum, while an Alexander Calder may control, or receive compensation for, equivalent exploitations of his outdoor stabiles.
Similarly, noting that the statute's exemption from protection applies to two-dimensional but not three-dimensional representations of
buildings, one might suggest that this distinction makes the exemption of two-dimensional exploitations even more dubious. Why
should the architect's copyright entitlement to compensation for and
control over reproductions and derivative exploitations of her work
reach such three-dimensional exploitations as pencil sh~rpeners in
the form of miniature Chrysler Buildings, or tiny U.S. Capitol Buildings in liquid-filled plastic bubbles which, when shaken, give the illusion of falling snow, yet not extend to unlicensed posters, T-shirts,
lunch boxes, shower curtains, etc.? No public policy seems served by
this distinction. 73
It is worth observing, however, that if a building contains elements
separately protectable as pictorial, graphic or sculptural works (for
example, a gargoyle), the unauthorized pictorial representation of
that element may be an infringement of the pictorial, graphic or
sculptural work (not of the work of architecture).
The question arises whether the exemption of pictorial representations is compatible with the Berne Convention. Some Berne countries, notably France, uphold the architect's exclusive rights over
72. A footnote to the House Report, supra note 55, at 20 n.43, indicates that "Monumental, nonfunctional works of architecture are currently protected . . . as sculptural works.
These works are, nevertheless, architectural works, and, as such will no[w] be protected exclusively under section 102(a)(8)." This statement is problematic. It fails to elucidate what
constitutes a "nonfunctional work of architecture," as opposed to a "sculptural work." The
distinction is not apparent. For example, in which category should one rank Saarinen's monumental arch in St. Louis? Moreover, categorizing a monumental construction as "nonfunctional architecture" rather than as "sculpture" not only makes the work subject to the Copyright Act's new architecture provisions and its limitations, it removes the work from
protection under the Visual Artist's Rights Act, for the latter legislation applies to sculpture,
but not to architecture.
73. It is nonetheless reasonable to accommodate noncommercial two-dimensional representations of publicly displayed buildings. Paradigms of permissible pictorial representation
include the tourist's snapshot of the Capitol, or the architecture student's drawing of the
Chrysler Building. On the other hand, it seems likely that representations of this kind would
be excused under the fair use doctrine, and therefore do not require specific exemption in
the architecture law.
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such reproductions of their works, at least when the building constitutes the primary subject of the two-dimensional representation and
the photograph is made for commercial gain. 7 ' However, in meetings
held jointly by the World Intellectual Property Organization (the
body that administers the Berne Convention) and UNESCO, the conferees seeking to elaborate general principles of copyright law for
works of architecture proposed:
The reproduction of the external image of a work of architecture by
means of photography, cinematography, painting, sculpture, drawing or
similar methods should not require the authorization of the author if it
is done for private purposes or, even if it is done for commercial purposes, where the work of architecture stands in a public street, road,
square or other place normally accessible to the public. 75

Thus, if one acknowledges that the proposal expresses a generally
held interpretation of the scope of Berne Convention coverage of architectural works, then the new U.S. law is not inconsistent with
treaty guarantees.
The Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act preempts state
regulation of equivalent rights in equivalent subject matter, but explicitly preserves "State and local landmarks, historic preservation,
74. See generally Note, N.Y.U. L. REv., supra note 52, at 431-33 (countries affording protection against two-dimensional representations of structures). On protection in France, see,
e.g., Coµrt of Cassation, First civil chamber, decision of July 16, 1987, 135 R.I.D.A. 94 Qan.
1988) (photograph incorporating a portion of architectural structure -monumental fountain
at La Defense - does not violate architect's rights because the photograph "did not communicate to the public the characteristic original traits of the fountain, and therefore did not
constitute a partial reproduction"); Paris Court of Appeals (4th chamber) decision of June 19,
1979, 109 R.I.D.A.. 208 Quly 1981) (photograph of.building: individual reproduction of a
house by means of a photograph, violates the architect's exclusive rights; had the house been
captured as part of an overall ensemble, no infringement would have been found); Tribunal
de Grande Instance, Paris, decision of May 19, 1988, 32 CAHIERS DU DROJT D'AUTEUR [C. DU
D.A.] 12 (1990) (photograph of "La Geode," a pavilion in a science park, appeared without
architect's authorization and without attribution on the cover of a book jacket; infringement
found); Tribunal de Grande Instance, Draguignan, judgment of May 16, 1972, 76 R.I.D.A.
177 (Apr. 1973) (commercial photographs ()f housing development; court acknowledges that
the natural setting of the housing development is not protected, but determines that the primary subject of the photographs was not the overall setting, but the housing development; in
one instance, the court bases this determination on the percentage of the photograph's surface area devoted to the housing development-50%, and the placement of the development
in the foreground of the photograph). See, e.g., Bertrand, La reproduction photographique des
batiments et des monuments au regard du droit d'auteur, 31 C. DUD.A. 12 (1990); Huet, Architecture et droit d'auteur en France en 1990, 31 C. DU D.A. 1 (1990); Huet, Architecture et droit
d'auteur, 88 R.I.D.A. 3, 19-23 (Apr. 1976) (discussing photographs of architectural works in
public places); Fremond, Des droits sur l'image d'un immeuble, 9 C. DU D.A. 12 ( 1988) (discussing
doctrine of individualized presentation of architectural works in photographs).
75. Principle WA. 7, 22 COPYRIGHT 401, 411 (Dec. 1986).
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zoning or building codes . . .. " 78 Congress has thus made clear that
while most state private law rights pertaining to works of architecture
may be preempted, the new federal legislation is not intended to hinder state and local public authorities' activities, even if these affect
architectural works and may achieve results similar to those that an
architect might obtain under the new amendment.
CONCLUSION

The 1990 Visual Artists Rights Act and the Architectural Works
Copyright Protection Act enhance the U.S.' compliance with Berne
Convention standards of subject matter and substantive copyright
coverage. In both instances, Congress continued to adhere to its
"minimalist" approach to enlargement of copyright protections. 77
This cautious, if not begrudging, strategy may provoke criticism that
the U.S. remains reluctant to fulfill Berne mandates, particularly in
the area of moral rights. Nonetheless, U.S. progress, albeit slow, is
real. 78 Moreover, one may hope that the Visual Artists Rights Act
affords a first, rather than a last, step toward evolving more generalized guarantees of the rights of attribution and integrity of creators
of original works of authorship.

76. Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act § 705; 17 U.S.C. § 30l(b)(2)(3}(4).
77. Congress' modifications of the Copyright Act to permit U.S. adherence to Berne Convention reflected its "minimalist approach" to revision. See Ginsburg & Kernochan, supra
note 11, at 5 & n.29, and sources cited therein.
78. For a critique of a different legislative approach, adopted in the 1988 U .K. Copyright
Designs and Patents Act, of enacting overall moral rights guarantees, then riddling the new
protections with myriad exceptions, see Ginsburg, Moral Rights in a Common Law System,
[ 1990] I ENT. LR 121, 128-29. See also S. McCartney, Moral Rights under the United Kingdom's Copyright, Design and Patents Act 1988 (to be published in 15 Colum.-VLA J.L. &
Arts (Winter 1991)).
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Appendix A
TITLE VI - VISUAL ARTISTS RIGHTS
SEC. 601. SHORT TITLE.
This title may be cited as the "Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990".
SEC. 602. WORK OF VISUAL ART DEFINED.
Section 101 of title 17, United States Code, is amended by inserting after the paragraph defining "widow" the following:
"A 'work of visual art' is "(l) a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a single
copy, in a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and
consecutively numbered by the author, or in the case of a sculpture,
in multiple cast, carved, or fabricated sculptures of two hundred or
fewer that are consecutively numbered by the author and bear the
signature or other identifying mark of the author; or
"(2) a still photographic image produced for exhibition purposes
only, existing in a single copy that is signed by the author, or in a
limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the author.
A work of visual art does not include "(A)(i) any poster, map, globe, chart, technical drawing, diagram,
model, applied art, motion picture or other audiovisual work, book
magazine, newspaper periodical, data base, electronic information
service, electronic publication, or similar publication;
"(ii) any merchandising item or advertising, promotional, descriptive, covering, or packaging material or container;
"(iii) any portion or part of any item described in clause (i) or (ii);
"(B) any work made for hire; or
"(C) any work not subject to copyright protection under this title.".
SEC. 603. RIGHTS OF ATTRIBUTION AND INTEGRITY.
(a) RIGHTS OF ATTRIBUTION AND INTEGRITY. - Chapter l of title 17,
United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 106 the
following new section:
§ 106A. Rights of certain authors to attribution and integrity
"(a) RIGHTS OF ATTRIBUTION AND INTEGRITY. - Subject to section
I 07 and independent of the exclusive rights provided in section l 06,
the author of a work of visual art "(I) shall have the right "(A) to claim authorship of that work, and
"(B) to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of any
work of visual art which he or she did not create;
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"(2) shall have the right to prevent the use of his or her name as
the author of the work of visual art in the event of a distortion, mutilation, or other modification of the work which would be prejudicial
to his or her honor or reputation and
"(3) subject to the limitations set forth in section l l 3(d), shall have
the right "(A) to prevent any intentions [sic] distortion, mutilation, or other
modification of that work which would be prejudicial to his or her
honor· or reputation, and any intentional distortion, mutilation, or
modification of that work is a violation of that right, and
"(B) to prevent any destruction of a work of recognized stature,
and any intentional or grossly negligent destruction of that work is a
violation of that right.
"(b) SCOPE AND EXERCISE OF RIGHTS. - Only the author of a work
of visual art has the rights conferred by subsection (a) in that work,
whether or not the author is the copyright owner. The authors of a
joint work of visual art are coowners of the rights conferred by subsection (a) in that work.
"(c) EXCEPTIONS. - (1) The modification of a work of visual art
which is a result of the passage of time or the inherent nature of the
materials is not a distortion, mutilation, or other modification described in subsection (a)(3)(A).
"(2) The modification of a work of visual art which is the result of
conservation, or of the public presentation, including lighting and
placement, of the work is not a destruction, distortion, mutilation, or
other modification described in subsection (a)(3) unless the modification is caused by gross negligence.
"(3) The rights described in paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection(a)
shall not apply to any reproduction, depiction, portrayal, or other use
of a work in, upon, or in any connection with any item described in
subparagraph (A) or (B) of the definition of 'work of visual art' in
section 101, and any such reproduction, depiction, portrayal, or
other use of a work is not a destruction, distortion, mutilation, or
other modification described in paragraph (3) of subsection (a).
"(d) DURATION OF RIGHTS. - (1) With .respect to works of visual art
created on or after the effective date set forth in section 9(a) of the
Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, the rights conferred by subsection
(a) shall endure for a term consisting of the life of the author.
"(2) With respect to works of visual art created before the effective
date set forth in section 9(a) of the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990,
but title to which has not, as of such effective date, been transferred
from the author, the rights conferred by subsection (a) shall be coex-
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tensive with, and shall expire at the same time as, the rights conferred by section 106.
"(3) In the case of a joint work prepared by two or more authors,
the rights conferred by subsection (a) shall endure for a term consisting of the life of the last surviving author.
"(4) All terms of the rights conferred by subsection (a) run to the
end of the calendar year in which they would otherwise expire.
"(e) TRANSFER AND WAIVER. - (1) The rights conferred by subsection (a) may not be transferred, but those rights may be waived if the
author expressly agrees to such waiver in a written instrument signed
. by the author. Such instrument shall specifically identify the work,
and uses of that work to which the waiver applies, and the waiver
shall apply only to the work and uses so identified. In the case of a
joint work prepared by two or more authors, a waiver of rights under
this paragraph made by one such author waives such rights for all
such authors.
"(2) Ownership of the rights conferred by subsection (a) with respect to a work of visual art is distinct from ownership of any copy of
that work, or of a copyright or any exclusive right under a copyright
in that work. Transfer of ownership of any copy of a work of visual
art, or of a copyright or any exclusive right under a copyright, shall
not constitute a waiver of the rights conferred by subsection (a). Except as may otherwise be agreed by the author in a written instrument signed by the author, a waiver of the rights conferred by subsection (a) with respect to a work of visual art shall not constitute a
transfer of ownership of any copy of that work, or of ownership of a
copyright or of any exclusive right under a copyright in that work.".
(b) CONFORMING AMENDMENT. - The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 1 of title 17, United States Code, is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 106 the following new item:
"106A. Rights of certain authors to attribution and integrity.".
SEC. 604. REMOVAL OF WORKS OF VISUAL ART FROM
BUILDINGS.
Section 113 of title 17, United States Code, is amended by adding
at the end thereof the following:
"(d)(l) In a case in which "(A) a work of visual art has been incorporated in or made part of
a building in such a way that removing the work from the building
will ·cause the destruction, distortion, mutilation, or other modification of the work as described in section 106A(a)(3), and
"(B) the author consented to the installation of the work in the
building either before the effective date set forth in section 9(a) of
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the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, or in a written instrument executed on or after such effective date that is signed by the owner of
the building and the author and that specifies that installation of the
work may subject the work to destruction, distortion, mutilation, or
other modification, by reason of its removal, then the rights conferred by paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 106A(a) shall not apply.
"(2) If the owner of a building wishes to remove a work of visual
art which is a part of such building and which can be removed from
the building without the destruction, distortion, mutilation, or other
modification of the work as described in section 106A(a)(3), the author's rights under paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 106A(a) shall
apply unless "(A) the owner has made a dilig~nt, good faith attempt without
success to notify the author of the owner's intended action affecting
the work of visual art, or
"(b) the owner did provide such notice in writing and the person so
notified failed, within 90 days after receiving such notice, either to
remove the work or to pay for its removal.
For purposes of subparagraph (A), an owner shall be presumed to
have made a diligent; good faith attempt to send notice if the owner
sent such notice by registered mail to the author at the most recent
address of the author that was recorded with the Register of Copyrights pursuant to paragraph (3). If the work is removed at the expense of the author, title to that copy of the work shall be deemed to
be in the author.
"(3) The Register of Copyrights shall establish a system of records
whereby any author of a work of visual art that has been incorporated in or made part of a building, may record his identity and address with the Copyright Office. The Register shall also establish procedures under which any such author may update the information so
recorded, and procedures under which owners of buildings may record with the Copyright Office evidence of their efforts to comply
with this subsection.".
SEC. 605. PREEMPTION.
Section 301 of title 17, United States Code, is amended by adding
at the end the following:
· "(f)(l) On or after the effective date set forth in section 9(a) of the
Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, all legal or equitable rights that
are equivalent to any of the rights conferred by section 106A with
respect to works of visual art to which the rights conferred by section
106A apply are governed exclusively by section 106A and section
l l 3(d) and the provision of this title relating to such sections. There-
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after, no person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in
any work of visual art under the common law or statutes of any State.
"(2) Nothing in paragraph (1) annuls or limits any right or remedies under the common law or statutes of any State with respect to
"(A) any cause of action from undertakings commenced before the
effective date set forth in section 9(a) of the Visual Artists Rights Act
of 1990;
"(B) activities violating legal or equitable rights that are not
equivalent to any of the rights conferred by section 106A with respect to works of visual art; or
"(C) activities violating legal or requitable [sic] rights which extend
beyond the life of the author.".
SEC. 606. INFRINGEMENT ACTIONS.
(a) IN GENERAL. - Section 50l(a) of title 17, United States Code, is
amended (1) by inserting after "118" the following: "or of the author as provided in section 106A(a)"; and
(2) by striking out "copyright." and inserting in lieu thereof "copyright or right of the author, as the case may be. For purposes of this
chapter (other than section 506), any reference to copyright shall be
deemed to include the rights conferred by section 106A(a).".
(b) EXCLUSION OF CRIMINAL PENALTIES. - Section 506 of title 17,
United States Code, is amended by adding at the end thereof the
following:
"(£) RIGHTS OF ATTRIBUTION AND INTEGRITY. - Nothing in this section applies to infringement of the rights conferred by section
106A(a).".
(c) REGISTRATION NOT A PREREQUISITE TO SUIT AND CERTAIN REMEDIES. - (1) Section 41 l(a) of title 17, United States Code, is amended
in the first sentence by inserting after "United States" the following:
"and an action brought for a violation of the rights of the author
under section 106A(a)".
(2) Section 412 of title 17, United States Code, is amended by inserting "an action brought for a violation of the rights of the author
under section I06A(a) or" after "other than".
SEC. 607. FAIR USE
Section 107 of title 17, United States Code, is amended by striking
out "section 106" and inserting in lieu thereof "secdons 106 and
106A".
SEC. 608. STUDIES BY COPYRIGHT OFFICE.
(a) STUDY ON w AVIER [sic] OF RIGHTS PROVISION. -
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(1) STUDY. - The Register of Copyrights shall conduct a study on
the extent to which rights conferred by subsection (a) of section
106A of title 17, United States Code, have been waived under subsection (e)(l) of such section.
(2) REPORT TO CONGRESS. - Not later than 2 years after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Register of Copyrights shall submit to
the Congress a report on the progress of the study conducted under
paragraph (1). Not later than 5 years after such date of enactment,
the Register of Copyrights shall submit to the Congress a final report
on the results of the study conducted under paragraph (1), and any
recommendations that the Register may have as a result of the study.
(b) STUDY ON RESALE ROY AL TIES. (1) NATURE or STUDY. - The Register of Copyrights, in consultation with the Chair of the National Endowment for the Arts, shall
conduct a study on the feasibility of implementing (A) a requirement that, after the first sale of a work of art, a royalty on any resale of the work, consisting of a percentage of the price,
be paid to the author of the work; and
(B) other possible requirements that would achieve the objective of
allowing an author of a work of art to share monetarily in the enhanced value of that work.
(2) GROUPS TO BE CONSULTED.. _ The study under paragraph (1)
shall be conducted in consultation with other appropriate departments and agencies of the United States, foreign governments, and
groups involved in the creation, exhibition, dissemination, and preservation of works of art, including artists, art dealers, collectors of
fine art, and curators of art museums.
(3) REPORT TO CONGRESS. - Not later than 18 months after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Register of Copyrights shall
submit to the Congress a report containing the results of the study
conducted under this subsection.
SEC. 609. FIRST AMENDMENT APPLICATION.
This title does not authorize any governmental entity to take any
action or enforce restrictions prohibited by the First Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States.
SEC. 610. EFFECTIVE DATE.
(a) IN GENERAL. - Subject to subsection (b) and except as provided
in subsection (c), this title and the amendments made by this title take
effect 6 months after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(B) APPLICABILITY. - The rights created by section 106A of title
17, United States Code, shall apply to ( 1) works created before the effective date· set forth in subsection
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(a) but title to which has not, as of such effective date, been transferred from the author, and
(2) works created on or after such effective date, but shall not apply to any destruction, distortion, mutilation, or other modification
(as described in section 106A(a)(3) of such title) of any work which
occurred before such effective date.
(c) SECTION 608. - Section 608 takes effect on the date of the enactment of this Act.
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Appendix B
TITLE VII - ARCHITECTURAL WORKS
SEC. 701. SHORT TITLE.
This title may be cited as the "Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act".
SEC. 702. DEFINITIONS.
(a) ARCHITECTURAL WORKS. -Section 101 of title 17, United States
Code, is amended by inserting after the definition of "anonymous
work" the following:
"An 'architectural work' is the design of a building as embodied in
any tangible medium of expression, including a building, architectural plans, or drawings. The work includes the overall form as well
as the arrangement and composition of spaces and elements in the
design, but does not include individual standard features.".
(b) BERNE CONVENTION WoRK. - Section 101 of title 17, United
States Code, is amended in the definition of "Berne Convention
work" (1) in paragraph (3)(B) by striking "or" after the semicolon;
(2) in paragraph (4) by striking the period and inserting"; or"; and
(3) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following:
"(5) in the case of an architectural work embodied in a building,
such building is erected in a country adhering to the Berne
Convention.".
SEC. 703. SUBJECT MATTER OF COPYRIGHT.
Section 102(a) of title 17, United States Code, is amended (1) in paragraph (6) by striking "and" after the semicolon;
(2) in paragraph (7) by striking the period and inserting "; and";
and
(3) by adding after paragraph (7) the following: "(8) architectural
works.".
SEC. 704. SCOPE OF EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS IN ARCHITECTURAL WORKS.
(a) IN GENERAL. - Chapter 1 of title 17, United States Code, 1s
amended by adding at the end the following:
"§ 120. Scope of exclusive rights in architectural works
"(a) PICTORIAL REPRESENTATIONS PERMITTED. - The copyright in
an architectural work that has been constructed does not include the
right to prevent the making, distributing, or public display of pictures, paintings, photographs, or other pictorial representations of
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the work, if the building in which the work is embodied is located in
or ordinarily visible from a public place.
"(b) ALTERATIONS TO AND DESTRUCTION OF BUILDINGS. - Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(2), the owners of a building
embodying an architectural work may, without the consent of the au-.
thor or copyright owner of the architectural work, make or authorize
the making of alterations to such building, and destroy or authorize
the destruction of such building.".
(b) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS. - (1) The table of sections at the
beginning of chapter 1 of title 17, United States Code, is amended by
adding at the end of the following:
"120. Scope of exclusive rights in architectural works.".
(2) Section 106 of title 17, United States Code, is amended by striking "119" and inserting "120".
SEC. 705. PREEMPTION.
Section 30l(b) of title 17, United States Code, is amended (1) in paragraph (2) by striking "or" after the semicolon;
(2) in paragraph (3) by striking the period and inserting"; or"; and
(3) by adding after paragraph (3) the following:
"(4) State and local landmarks, historic preservation, zoning, or
building codes, relating to architectural works protected under section 102(a)(8). ".
SEC. 706. EFFECTIVE DA TE.
The amendments made by this title apply to (1) any architectural work created on or after the date of the enactment of this Act; and
(2) any architectural work that, on the date of the enactment of
this Act, is unconstructed and embodied in unpublished plans or
drawings, except that protection for such architectural work under
title 17, United States Code, by virtue of the amendments made by
this title, shall terminated on December 31, 2002, unless the work is
constructed by that date.

